Burying Our Constitution in the Sand?: Evaluating the Ostrich Response to the Use
of International and Foreign Law in U.S. Constitutional Interpretation1
I.

Introduction
In the last few years, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued several high-profile

opinions that refer to international and foreign law,2 igniting a heated debate among the
justices, legal scholars, politicians,3 and commentators regarding the proper use of
international and foreign law in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Justice Scalia, usually
joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, has led the fight against the use of
foreign and, to a lesser extent, international law as a basis for constitutional decisionmaking. Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Kennedy, O’Connor, Souter, Stevens, and White,
have asserted that international and foreign law has relevance to their work and that is not
inappropriate to refer to such sources in their decision-making.4
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See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), (holding that executions of juveniles below the age of
18 constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003), (striking down a Texas statute that makes it a crime for two persons of the same sex
to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), (upholding the
constitutionality of the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policies with respect to diversity);
and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), (holding that executions of mentally retarded criminals
constitute cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment).
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Certain politicians who advocate against the use of such sources have introduced resolutions and
legislation that would limit the ability of federal courts to use international or foreign law in their decisions.
See, e.g., H.R. 446, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003); Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong.
§ 1 (2005); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005).
4

Chief Justice Roberts’ views on the issue are still largely unknown. However, during his confirmation
hearings before the Senate, Chief Justice Roberts did express concern “about the use of foreign law as
precedent.” Confirmation of John Roberts to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court: Hearings before the
Senate Judiciary Comm., (Sept. 13, 2005), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091301210.html. Similarly, new Supreme Court Justice Samuel
Alito stated during his confirmation hearings: “I don’t think that foreign law is helpful in interpreting the
Constitution,” although he allowed that using foreign law is legitimate in other situations, such as when
interpreting treaties or when called for by private contracts. U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on
Judge Samuel Alito’s Nomination to the Supreme Court (Jan. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/10/AR2006011000781.html.
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The debate regarding the use of foreign and international law is really a sub-set of
the debate about the proper method of interpreting the U.S. Constitution. One goal of this
article is to demonstrate that there are legitimate reasons to use these sources in
constitutional interpretation in appropriate cases. In fact, use of international law sources
can be reconciled with many classic theories of constitutional interpretation. A second
goal is to clarify distinctions between these sources and to demonstrate how and why
each may be used most appropriately by the Court.
Objections to the use of international law in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
are somewhat surprising in light of the fact that international law has always been part of
U.S. law. International law is expressly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution in more than
one place. International law acts to define the United States as a sovereign nation-state,
with all the powers associated with that status, and imposes responsibilities upon the use
of those powers. U.S. constitutional concepts of individual rights and international
human rights law share common natural law foundations and the development of each
has greatly influenced the development of the other.
Both international and foreign law exercised a heavy influence on the framers of
the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has referred to international
and foreign sources in many cases throughout its history. In light of this history, it
would be surprising if the U.S. Supreme Court did not look to international law for
guidance. However, there remains much disagreement as to the use of international and
foreign law in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, particularly with respect to defining the
scope of various individual rights.
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Despite a fairly high degree of commentary on this issue in recent times, the
positions of the parties on both sides of this debate have not been fully explicated.
Therefore, the bases for their respective positions are somewhat unclear. In addition, this
debate has been confused by the conflation of international law and foreign law sources
and a lack of careful distinction between various sources of international law.5
Furthermore, critics, including most prominently Justice Scalia, have rightly chastised the
Supreme Court for its selective use of foreign and international law without articulating
clearer standards regarding the circumstances under which it is appropriate to do so.
Accordingly, this article seeks to analyze why, when, and how international and
foreign law is and should be used by the U.S. Supreme Court in its decision-making. The
article begins by distinguishing the two very different sources of law at issue in this
debate – international law and foreign law. As the article demonstrates, the use of
international law is clearly required by the U.S. Constitution in some cases, whereas the
use of foreign law has a weaker constitutional basis. There are also different sources of
international law, treaty law and customary international law, which are not always as
clearly distinguished as they should be in the context of this debate.
The article summarizes the arguments on both sides of the debate and seeks to
clear away some of the confusion as to what international and foreign law is being used
5

For example, several newspapers recently ran an Associated Press article under a title which suggested the
Attorney General was critical of international law, when in fact the article discussed Attorney General
Gonzales’s concerns with respect to the use of foreign law, not international law. Compare Mark
Sherman, U.S. Attorney General: Judges Citing International Law Wrong, Unworkable, The Legal
Intelligencer, Oct. 20, 2005, at 4, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1129626313552 and
Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at George Mason University, Oct. 18, 2005,
available at http://releases.usnewswire.com/printing.asp?id=55230. As is discussed below, foreign law and
international law are two very different sources of law. In fact, Attorney General Gonzales himself drew
clear distinctions between the use of international and foreign law in his recent remarks at the University of
Chicago Law School. See Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at the University of
Chicago Law School, Nov. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/ag_speech_0511091.html.
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and how each is being used by the current Supreme Court. The article then examines the
influence of international and foreign law on the U.S. Constitution, both at its inception
and throughout its history. This examination demonstrates that the use of international
law by the U.S. Supreme Court in the area of individual rights is well grounded in history
and political theory concepts of sovereignty and natural law, which recognize a
responsibility of states to protect human rights.
Through this examination, the article demonstrates that, not only is it entirely
appropriate for the U.S. Supreme Court to take into account international law when
interpreting the Constitution in many cases, the Court often has an obligation to do so. In
fact, failing to take international law into account would be contrary to the framers’
intentions, violate the social compact upon which the nation is formed, and could
undermine the Supreme Court’s legitimacy. The article also suggests reasons why the
Supreme Court should take international law into account in the future. The article
demonstrates why foreign law has a weaker historical and theoretical basis in our
democratic system and should therefore be approached with much greater caution.
Finally, the article proposes some guidelines for when and how international and foreign
law should or should not be used in U.S. Constitutional interpretation in the future.
II.

Clarifying the Issue
Before delving into the arguments of the various parties, it is first necessary to

clarify exactly what the debate is all about. There are two very different types of law at
issue in this debate: international law and foreign law. These two very different types of
law are sometimes conflated by commentators, which has served to confuse the debate on
this subject.
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First, there is international law, which is commonly thought to be derived from
international treaties or conventions, customary international law, general principles of
law, and the works of jurists and scholars.6
With respect to conventional international law, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution makes treaties part of the supreme law of the land on par with federal
statutes.7 In the United States, treaties are made by the President, subject to the advice
and consent of two-thirds of the Senate.8 U.S. law recognizes a variety of different types
of international agreements that create binding international obligations for the United
States, including self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, treaties that have been
signed by the President, but not yet ratified, and other types of Executive international
agreements.9

6

Statute of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) art. 38(1).

7

U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2; Whitney v. Robinson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). A recent unobjectionable
example of the use of international treaty law by a Supreme Court justice occurred in Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003), where the Supreme Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s admission
policies regarding the promotion of diversity. Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in which she
observed that the Court’s holding “accords with the international understanding of the office of affirmative
action.” Id. at 344. In support of this statement, Justice Ginsberg cited two multilateral treaties aimed at
eliminating discrimination, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Annex A to G.A. Res. 2106, 20 U.N. GAOR Res. Supp. (No.14) 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014,
Art. 2(2) (1965), which was ratified by the United States in 1994, (see State Dept., Treaties in Force 422423 (June 1996)), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), Annex to G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Res. Supp. (No. 46) 194, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1979) (the United States signed CEDAW in 1980, but the Senate has not yet given its advice and consent
to ratification of the treaty). Justice Ginsburg thus used international treaty law that is part of the supreme
law of the United States as further justification for the holding of the case, as well as an international treaty
which the United States has signed, but not yet ratified.
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U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cl.2.
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Over time, it has come to be accepted practice that the President may enter into international agreements
which are given the same legal status as treaties, even though they are not subject to the advice and consent
of the Senate. See, e.g., U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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Customary international law, defined as general state practice accepted as law,10
also is binding law in the United States. As Justice Gray of the U.S. Supreme Court
famously stated more than a century ago:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it
are duly presented for their determination. For this
purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must
be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and,
as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and
commentators, who by years of labor research and
experience, have made themselves peculiarly well
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.11
Thus, the Supreme Court has a duty to ascertain whether a particular state practice has
risen to the status of a customary international law rule or a general principle of law that
is binding on the United States.12 If so, that rule becomes part of U.S. law.13
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Statute of the ICJ art. 38(1)(b).
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The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). In fact, the concept of incorporating the law of nations into
domestic law predated the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Respublica v. de Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111,
1 L.Ed. 59 (1784). “The Framers understood the law of nations (which was then almost entirely customary
practice, as opposed to treaties) to be part of the “law” of the United States. President Washington claimed
authority to execute the law of nations by executive order, e.g., by declaring neutrality in the 1793 war
between France and Great Britain. He also issued regulations defining specific offenses against the law of
nations which provided the governing law until Congress passed applicable legislation.” PHILLIP R.
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 183 (Foundation Press 2002)
[hereafter U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW]. See also Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early
American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 824-28 (1989). The Executive branch continues to participate in
the development of customary international law today by issuing executive orders claiming jurisdiction
over fisheries, the continental shelf, air space and the Exclusive Economic Zone. See TRIMBLE, FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW at 183; see also part III(D)(3) infra.
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See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729, 124 S.Ct. 2764, 2755 (2004) (“For two centuries we
have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.”). See also Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (“It is, of course, true that United States courts
apply international law as a part of our own in appropriate circumstances.”); United States v. Smith, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 5 L.Ed. 57 (1820) (“The common law, too, recognises [sic] and punishes piracy as an
offense, not against its municipal code, but as an offense against the law of nations, (which is part of the
common law,)”); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (“[T]he Court is bound by the law of
nations which is part of the law of the land.”); Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 281, 1 L.Ed. 568 (1796)
(“When the United States declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its
modern state of purity and refinement.”).
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The second category of law at issue in this debate is foreign law, largely
consisting of foreign statutes or codes and decisions by the national courts of foreign
countries. As a general rule, foreign law, unlike international law, is not binding on the
United States, unless there is such a consensus among the legal systems of the world that
particular rule has gained the status of a general principle of law, in which case the rule
may have a status akin to that of customary international law.14
The question remains, however, what does it mean to say that the United States is
bound by a treaty provision or a rule of customary international law? The federal courts
have created some rules with respect to the relationship between federal statutes and
treaties, such as the Charming Betsy rule15 and the last-in-time rule.16 But these rules do
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Despite this history and case law, some scholars have argued in recent years that customary international
law is not part of the supreme law of the land such that it preempts state law. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997). This position has been soundly refuted by other scholars, such as
Philip Jessup, Louis Henkin, and Harold H. Koh who have used history, prior case law, and structural
arguments based on federalism and separation of powers principles to demonstrate that customary
international law is part of the binding law of the United States. See,e.g., Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740 (1939); Louis Henkin, The
Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 853, 876 (1987); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law
Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 666 and n. 221 (1998); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really
State Law?. 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998). Jessup’s argument was accepted by the Supreme Court in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425-428 (1964) and subsequent cases. See Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law?. 111 HARV. L. REV. at 1834-1838 and accompanying footnotes.
14
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d cir. 1980) (The court noted a survey that showed that torture
had been banned in more than 55 national constitutions, thus supporting a determination that torture is
prohibited by customary international law.)
15

In Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804), the Supreme Court held that
“an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction” exists.
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“By the Constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of
legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior
efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will always
endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating the language of
either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date with control the other, provided always the
stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.” Whitney, supra note ___, at 194.
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not address whether federal courts are required to interpret the U.S. Constitution in a
manner that is consistent with an international law rule. In the event it is not possible to
reconcile the two, does international law ever trump the U.S. Constitution? Even if
international law does not supersede the Constitution, is there an obligation to interpret
the Constitution in a manner consistent with international law principles similar to the
Charming Betsy doctrine for statutes? If yes, when? The following sections examine
these questions and suggest some answers.
III.

Why and How Are International and Foreign Law Currently Used by the
U.S. Supreme Court?
The justices on the current U.S. Supreme Court largely fall into two camps with

respect to whether and how the court should use international or foreign law in its
jurisprudence. A minority of the justices, usually led by Justice Scalia, has been
outspoken against the use of foreign and, to a lesser extent, international law as a basis
for constitutional interpretation. The majority, on the other hand, finds international and
foreign law to be instructive and seems increasing willing to refer to such sources in
decision-making.
A.

Justice Scalia’s “Anti-Foreign Law” Position

Justice Scalia has expressed far stronger opposition to the use of foreign legal
materials, which he defines as statutes and judicial opinions, than he has to international
law. Despite his “anti-foreign law” position, he certainly does not reject the use of all
international and foreign law.17 However, Justice Scalia has been one of the most vocal
and colorful critics of the Supreme Court’s references to international and foreign law in
17

Justice Antonin Scalia, Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, Keynote Address to the American
Society of International Law (April 2, 2004), in 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 305 (2004) [hereinafter
Scalia Keynote Address].
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recent cases, writing several dissenting opinions in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas have joined. Because he has spoken publicly on the topic on more than
one occasion, I have chosen to use Justice Scalia’s position to illustrate the positions of
those who generally oppose the use of foreign and international law by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Where appropriate, I also have added criticisms made by other judges and
scholars to more fully address all the arguments that have been raised.
As indicated above, Justice Scalia believes international and foreign law may be
relevant in some cases. He certainly agrees that treaties ratified by the U.S. are part of
the supreme law of the land and he will use international law in the interpretation of a
treaty.18 In addition, Justice Scalia has stated that: “Foreign constructions [of
international treaties] are evidence of the original shared understanding of the contracting
parties” and are therefore appropriately taken into account.19 Justice Scalia also believes
that it is appropriate for the Court to consult foreign or international law when directed by
a federal statute to do so, such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.20

Finally,

Justice Scalia has stated that:
foreign statutory and judicial law can be consulted in
assessing the argument that a particular construction of an
ambiguous provision in a federal statute would be
disastrous. If foreign courts have long been applying
precisely the rule argued against, and disaster has not

18

Transcript of Discussion between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer at the
American University College of Law (January 13, 2005) at 5 [hereinafter AU Transcript], available at
http:/domino.american,edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F2.
19

Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660, 124 S.Ct. 1221, 1232 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

20

Scalia Keynote Address, at 305. Although Justice Scalia would limit any claims based on the law of
nations to the law of nations as understood in the 18th century. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
748-751, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2775-76, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
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ensued, unless there is some countervailing factor at work
the argument can safely be rejected.21
On the other hand, Justice Scalia has strenuously objected to the use of foreign
law for two primary reasons. First, Justice Scalia does not believe foreign legal materials
should be allowed to influence the determination of the substantive meaning of the words
of the Constitution itself.22 Justice Scalia suggests that foreign law should not be
authoritative because we as a nation do not “want to be governed by the views of
foreigners.”23 Second, Justice Scalia has criticized the Court for its selective use of
foreign law without clearly articulated standards as to when foreign law will be
consulted.24
In addition to these two primary objections, Justice Scalia also is critical of the
Court’s use of foreign law when it has not made a sufficient inquiry into whether the
foreign legal system is sufficiently similar to that of the United States such that a fair
comparisons can be made.25 If the justices use foreign law, they have to select which
rules to follow among competing rules and there are no criteria to follow in deciding
which foreign law to use.26

21

Scalia Keynote Address, at 306.

22

Scalia Keynote Address, at 307. Justice Scalia only discusses foreign legal materials here and not
international legal materials.

23

AU Transcript, at 5.

24

Roper, 543 U.S. at 622-628 (Part III) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

25

Roper, 543 U.S. at 624.

26

AU Transcript, at 5. Like Justice Scalia, Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner also is concerned about
the use of foreign and international law. Judge Posner cites four problems with using foreign and
international law: (1) there are too many sources, making research difficult; (2) foreign judges come from
different “socio-historico-politico-institutional backgrounds” making accurate and fair comparisons
difficult; (3) foreign judges have no democratic legitimacy in the U.S.; and (4) judges use foreign and
international law to justify their own personal preferences. See also Richard Posner, No Thanks, We
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B. Why some justices are willing to use international or foreign law
Justice Breyer has been one of the most outspoken justices in favor of using
foreign and international law. He has pointed out that foreign judges and U.S. Supreme
Court justices are both human beings facing similar problems.27 In addition, many
foreign societies are becoming more democratic. Foreign judges are interpreting
documents that protect basic human rights, as does the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of
Rights.28 For these reasons, U.S. Supreme Court justices can learn from the experience
of foreign judges who have faced similar issues.29 Justices who favor consideration of
international and foreign legal sources do not suggest, however, that the U.S. Supreme
Court is in any way bound by the interpretations of these foreign judges; only that we
may learn from them.30 Thus, this group of justices appears to be advocating for the use
of foreign materials primarily for comparative educational purposes.

Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFFAIRS, July-Aug. 2004, at 40, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.html. All of these concerns
are addressed in Part V below.
27

AU Transcript, at 5.

28

AU Transcript, at 6-7. In her recent keynote address to the American Society of International Law,
Justice Ginsberg noted: “an evolving appreciation that U.S. judges are not alone in the endeavor to interpret
fundamental human rights norms and apply them to concrete cases” and opined that “[t]he U.S. judicial
system will be the poorer, I believe, if we do not share our experience with, and learn from, legal systems
with values and a commitment to democracy similar to our own.” Ruth Bader Ginsberg, “’A Decent
Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind’: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional
Adjudication (April 1, 2005), available at http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburg050401.html.
29

AU Transcript, at 7. Several of the Supreme Court justices have expressed agreement with this view.
See Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in
Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2003); Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address Before
the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 16, 2002), in 96 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 348, 350 (2002). Even Chief Justice Rehnquist has expressed the view that “it’s time
for the U.S. courts began looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own
deliberative process.” William H. Rehnquist, Forward to DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW viii (V. Jackson and M. Tushnet, ed., 2002).
30

AU Transcript, at 6.
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C.

Recent Examples of Cases in Which International and Foreign Law
Has Been Used by the U.S. Supreme Court

Given these different attitudes towards the use of international and foreign law in
U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, it is appropriate to examine how these sources actually
are being used by the current Supreme Court. As mentioned at the outset of this article,
there have been a number of cases in the past few years in which the Supreme Court has
referred to international or foreign law sources in its opinions.31 This section will briefly
review some of the most relevant aspects of this recent jurisprudence.
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court struck down a Virginia law permitting
the execution of mentally retarded persons.32 The Court held that imposing capital
punishment on mentally retarded persons constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment because such persons have “disabilities in
areas of reasoning, judgment and control of their impulses” and, therefore, “do not act
with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal
conduct.”33 In assessing the constitutionality of capital punishment for mentally retarded
persons, the Court stated that it must be determined whether the punishment is excessive
based on currently prevailing moral standards.34 The Court further held that the best
evidence of those standards is state legislation and found that the consistent trend is

31

See cases cited in note 1.

32

Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.

33

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306. The court also held that these disabilities can jeopardize the fairness of the
proceedings against such persons. Id.

34

Id. at 311. The Court’s current Eight Amendment jurisprudence is based on its holding in Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958), wherein the Court held that: “The Amendment must draw its meaning from
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of maturing society.”
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toward prohibiting capital punishment for mentally retarded persons.35 The Court then
noted that this trend “reflects a much broader social and professional consensus,” citing
several amicus briefs. Of relevance here, one of the amicus briefs cited by the Court was
the Brief for the European Union filed as Amicus Curiae in another case, McCarver v.
North Carolina, O.T.2001, No. 00-8727, which established that “within the world
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally
retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”36
Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent in Atkins ridiculing the majority’s attempt
to find a consensus where less than a majority of states had enacted legislation outlawing
capital punishment for mentally retarded criminals.37 He directed his harshest criticism,
however, at the majority’s reference to the views of the “world community,” stating:
But the Prize for the Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate
“national consensus” must go to its appeal (deservedly
relegated to a footnote) to the views of assorted
professional and religious organizations, members of the
so-called “world community,” and respondents to opinion
polls . . . Equally irrelevant are the practices of the world
community, whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not
always those of our people.38
A second recent case which illustrates this debate regarding currently prevailing
moral standards is Lawrence v. Texas, where the Court found unconstitutional a Texas
statute that makes it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate

35

Id. at 311-316.

36

Id. at 316, n. 21. The Court also referred to an earlier case in which it had considered the views of “other
nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western European
community.” See Id.

37

Id. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

38

Id. at 347-48.
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sexual conduct because the statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.39 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, used international law to refute
earlier claims by Chief Justice Burger in Bowers v. Hardwick40 that: “Decisions of
individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention
throughout the history of Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly
rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards.”41 Justice Kennedy pointed out
that Chief Justice Burger’s “sweeping references . . . to the history of Western civilization
and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards did not take account of other
authorities pointing in an opposite direction.”42 Specifically, Justice Kennedy cited
European practices in this regard, including case law of the European Court of Human
Rights, in which the European Court held that laws similar to the Texas statute were
invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.43
Once again, Justice Scalia dissented, this time joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas.44 And once again, Justice Scalia took issue with the majority’s
reliance on the “views of a wider civilization.”45 Justice Scalia argued that Chief Justice

39

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.

40

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, CJ., concurring).

41

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571, citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.

42

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.

43

Id. at 573. Forty-five European nations currently ascribe to the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In addition, the Court cited an amicus brief filed by Mary
Robinson, former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, which established that other
nations have also taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to
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Burger’s statements in Bowers were mere dicta and were not the basis for the court’s
decision.46 Therefore, there was no need for the majority in Lawrence to refute them by
way of reference to other nations’ views on the issue.47
The most recent case involving this issue is Roper v. Simmons.48 In Roper, the
Supreme Court was called on to reconsider whether the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on “cruel and unusual punishments” forbids the execution of a juvenile offender who was
older than 15 but younger than 18 when he committed a capital crime. Just 15 years
previously, in Stanford v. Kentucky,49 a divided Supreme Court upheld the ability of
states to impose capital punishment on persons between the ages of 15 and 18. At that
time, the Court determined that no national consensus existed sufficient to label such
punishment cruel and unusual.50 In Roper, the Supreme Court held that enough states
have now abolished the death penalty for juvenile offenders to warrant a finding of a
national consensus against the execution of juvenile offenders. As a result, a 5-4 majority
of the Roper court held that Stanford is no longer controlling.
Writing for the majority in Roper, Justice Kennedy stated that the decision “finds
confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world
that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”51 The opinion
further states that while “this reality is not controlling,” the Court “has referred to the
46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Roper, 543 U.S. 551.

49

Standford, 492 U.S. 361.

50

Id. at 362.

51

Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
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laws of other countries and to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishment’” for almost 50
years.52 The opinion then cites several international treaties that ban the juvenile death
penalty, including the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the American Covenant on Human
Rights, and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Of seven other
countries that have executed juveniles since the Stanford decision, the opinion states that
all of them have since abolished or disavowed the practice. As a result, the Court
concluded, “it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone in a world that has
turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.”53
The Court placed special emphasis on the fact that the United Kingdom has long
since abolished the juvenile death penalty. The Court indicated that the United
Kingdom’s experience has particular relevance in light of the historic ties between our
countries and in light of the Eighth Amendment’s own origins (it is modeled on a parallel
provision in the English Declaration of Rights of 1689).54 Finally, the Court concluded
that while the overwhelming opinion of the world community against the juvenile death
penalty is not controlling, it does provide “respected and significant confirmation” for the
Court’s conclusions.55
Justice O’Conner wrote a dissenting opinion in which she discussed the
appropriate use of foreign and international law. She stated that because she believes
52

Id. at 575.

53

Id. at 577.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 578.
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there is lack of national consensus against the juvenile death penalty, she cannot assign a
“confirmatory role to the international consensus described by the Court.”56 However,
she stated that reference to foreign and international law is relevant to the Court’s
assessment of evolving standards of decency because of the special character of the
Eighth Amendment, which draws its meaning directly from the maturing values of a
civilized society. In this case, however, the existence of a global consensus cannot alter
the fact that domestic consensus is lacking.
Justice Scalia also wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas and Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined, once again attacking the use of foreign and international law by
the majority.57 Justice Scalia accused the majority of treating the views of U.S. citizens
as “essentially irrelevant” while “the views of other countries and the so-called
international community take center stage.”58 He pointed out that the President and the
Senate, the political bodies charged with making and ratifying treaties, have specifically
declined to join the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)59 and have entered a
reservation to the ICCPR preserving the right to execute juveniles.60 According to Justice
Scalia, these facts suggest that our country has not reached a national consensus against

56

Id. at 604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

57

Id. at 607, (Scalia, J., dissenting).

58

Id. at 622.
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Rights of the Child, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/11.htm (last visited
Feb. 20, 2006).
60
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Foreign Relations Report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. Rep. No. 102-23
(1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 659 (1992)
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the juvenile death penalty. He also chastised the majority for not inquiring more deeply
into whether foreign legal systems are sufficiently similar to that of the United States
such that fair comparisons can be made. Most fundamentally, however, Justice Scalia
rejected outright the idea that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the
world. In fact, he pointed out that when the practices of foreign nations do not conform
to the views of the majority of the Court, those foreign practices are rejected, citing
examples such as the Court’s establishment clause and abortion jurisprudence.61
While the Roper opinion was pending, Justice Scalia had an opportunity to
elaborate publicly on his view of the relationship between the Court’s jurisprudence and
foreign and international law. Although clearly not Justice Scalia’s preferred approach,
he recognized that in some areas of constitutional jurisprudence, beginning with the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, the Supreme Court
has adopted the notion that the Constitution is not static.62 Rather, the meaning of the
constitution “changes from era to era to comport with . . . the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”63 Justice Scalia does not believe
this approach is correct because it allows judges to decide what is best based on their own
personal viewpoints.64 However, if one accepts the notion that it is appropriate to look to
evolving standards of decency, Justice Scalia argues that one should only look to the
standards of decency in American society, not the standards of decency in foreign
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Roper, 543 U.S. at 625.
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AU Transcript, at 8.
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AU Transcript, at 8, quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES (American Enterprise Institute Press 2003).
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countries because foreign countries do not share our background, culture and moral
views.65 Justice Scalia would find American standards of decency in state legislation
because such legislation is democratically adopted by the American people.66
As will be shown below, attempts to completely “wall off” the U.S. Constitution
from international and foreign law: (1) are contrary to the development of international
law as incorporated into U.S. law, including the concepts of sovereignty and international
human rights; (2) are not consistent with the Framer’s understanding of the relationship
between individual rights, international law, and the Constitution; (3) are not supported
by the history of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence; and (4) are not good policy. The
majority position of the Supreme Court better reflects this history and understanding and
should continue to be developed through the Court’s jurisprudence.
IV.

Influence of International and Foreign Law on the U.S. Constitution
From before the founding of the United States of America, international law,

previously referred to as the law of nations, exercised a heavy influence on the
development of the U.S. Constitution and the Supreme Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence. Likewise, the Framers of the Constitution were familiar with international
and foreign law and often drew on that knowledge in deciding how to form a new nation.

65

AU Transcript, at 9. Justice Scalia suggests that the opinion of a “wise Zimbabwe judge or a wise
member of the House of Lords law committee” have little to do with what Americans believe. Id. at 11.
While there are clearly reasons to be more cautious about the use of foreign law in constitutional decisionmaking (see discussion below), Justice Scalia’s statement demonstrates an underlying assumption that
Americans are somehow fundamentally different from persons in other countries, such that foreign laws
and judicial decisions can never be relevant to Americans. This view is one of the underlying assumptions
that separates Justice Scalia from other justices, like Justice Breyer, who views the world as full of human
beings with common problems and struggles who can learn from one another’s experiences. Id. at 10-11.
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AU Transcript, at 17. Responses to Justice Scalia’s concerns regarding judges’ basing their decisions on
personal preferences and a lack of democratic legitimacy are addressed infra in Part V of this article.
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Two areas of international law are particularly relevant to the creation and
development of the United States as a constitutional government and its protection of
individual rights. First, the international law concept of sovereignty helped the fledging
United States to gain international recognition and imposed obligations on the federal
government vis-à-vis other nations, as well as towards its own subjects. As explained
below, the concept of sovereignty has continued to evolve, which in turn has implications
for a state such as the United States claiming to be sovereign. Second, the evolution of
the meaning of sovereignty paralleled the development of international human rights law.
International human rights law was greatly influenced by individual rights jurisprudence
that had developed under the U.S. Constitution. Both sovereignty and international
human rights law have their roots in natural law concepts and the evolution of each has
impacted the development of the other. Concepts of natural law, sovereignty and, later,
human rights, all influenced the framing of the Constitution and its interpretation over the
past two centuries. Accordingly, it is appropriate to take these sources into account both
to understand the original goals and purposes of the Constitution and to understand how
the Constitution should be interpreted and applied today.67 Thus, this next section will
focus on the development of these two aspects of international law, their impact on U.S.
constitutional law, and their relevance for this current constitutional debate.

67

Professor Cass Sunstein might label this reasoning a form of “soft originalism,” which he defines as
making a historical inquiry “not to obtain specific answers to specific questions, but instead to get a more
general sense of goals and purposes.” CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 173
(Oxford University Press 1996).
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A.

Natural Law Foundations of International Law

Both the international law of sovereignty and international human rights law
developed from concepts of natural law.68 Natural law, in turn, is sometimes said to be
synonymous with and sometimes said to be derived from divine law.69 Both divine law
and natural law are considered “higher law” that is universally applicable and superior to
positive law created by governments.70 One of the primary differences between the two
is that divine law is said to come from God, whereas some theorists suggested that natural
law is a product of “right reason.”71 The next section elaborates on how natural law
theories laid the foundation for the international law of sovereignty and international
human rights law.
B.

International Law of Sovereignty

The concept of sovereign states grew out of natural law concepts of equality of
persons, 72 but transformed the equality of persons into an equality of states. Over time,

68

Jay, supra note __ , at 821-22. “The ‘law of nations’ and ‘the law of nature’ were closely allied
concepts for [Chief Justice] Marshall and his contemporaries.” G. Edward White, The United Sates
Constitution in its Third Century: Foreign Affairs: History: The Marshall Court and International Law:
The Piracy Cases, 83 A.J.I.L. 727, 728 (1989).
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SEEN 5 (University of Pennsylvania Press 2d ed. 2003).
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Hein & Co. 1994). Antieau provides examples of the universality of divine and natural law from Ancient
Greek, Roman and Chinese philosophers, as well as from Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Id. at 2, 6, 2021, 28.
71
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the concept of sovereignty has changed and grown to have a number of different
meanings and aspects.73 This evolution, in turn, affects what it means for a state like the
United States that claims to be sovereign. Thus, this next section examines the evolving
concept of sovereignty in an effort to understand how the concept of sovereignty affected
the founding of the United States and the drafting of the new constitution and how its
continuing evolution over the last two centuries has impacted the United States.
1.

Evolving definition of sovereignty

The French philosopher, Jean Bodin is often credited with first stating the theory
of sovereignty in his 1576 Six Livres de la republic.74 Bodin asserted that sovereignty is
defined as power absolute and perpetual, “supreme,” and “subject to no law.”75 Only a
state possessed the power to decide how it would treat its people within its own borders
and those under its control elsewhere.76 Thomas Hobbes concurred in The Leviathan.77
Thus, traditional definitions of sovereignty often emphasized the powers or rights of the
sovereign, and not its responsibilities.
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For a description of the historical roots of the concept of sovereignty, see JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW
WITHOUT NATIONS? WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATE? 47-62
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Sovereignty and Globalization: Are Some States More Equal?, 28 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 381, 382
(2000).
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JEAN BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIC 1:179-228; 295-310 (Fayard 1986) (1576).

76

Id. Stephen Krasner refers to a state’s ability to exclude external actors from a given territory as
Westphalian sovereignty and a state’s ability to exercise effective control within its borders as domestic
sovereignty. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3-4 (Princeton University
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While Bodin argued that the sovereign was not subject to positive law because the
sovereign creates the positive laws, the sovereign is still bound by the laws of nature.78
Likewise, St. Thomas Aquinas and his followers believed that the Pope could be
disciplined if he violated divine or natural law.79 Hugo Grotius also attempted to
reconcile the concept of an independent and all powerful sovereign with the concept of
natural law, to which the sovereign was still subject.80 He theorized that the original
sovereignty of the people was transferred to a sovereign government, which had the
function and duty to protect the people in exchange.81 This theme was carried forward in
John Locke’s SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in which he emphasizes the social
contract between the people and the sovereign government. These concepts of
sovereignty formed the basis of the modern nation-state, with Locke’s social contract
theory having special relevance for the United States.
Many of the founding fathers were heavily influenced by the theories of John
Locke. In his SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT, Locke asserted that everyone is born
into a state of nature in which everyone is equal and is perfectly free to do as they choose
within the bounds of the laws of nature.82 Life in this state of nature is uncertain and
constantly exposed to invasion by others.83 Men act as judges in their own cases and
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have a tendency to be partial to their own cases and those of their friends.84 As a result,
individuals will choose to give up some of their freedom to form a political society or
civil government, the purpose of which is to remedy the inconveniences of the state of
nature and protect the lives, liberties, and property of the persons in the society.85 In this
political society, every man obligates himself to every other man to submit to the
determination of the majority and to be bound by it.86 Locke calls this state of affairs a
social compact.87
The American Revolution took Locke’s theories and put them into practice. The
idea of popular sovereignty became the basis of political legitimacy. Several of the
founding documents contain the word sovereignty, including the Declaration and
Resolves of the First Continental Congress, the Declaration of Independence and the
Articles of Confederation.88 The people of the thirteen colonies consented to the exercise
of power over them by a federal government in exchange for the protection of that
government.89 Thus, partly as a result of Locke’s ideas and certain political movements
such as the American and French Revolutions, the Westphalian concept of sovereignty
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changed from an emphasis on the sovereignty of the state to an emphasis on the
sovereignty of the people.
2.

Modern Concepts of Sovereignty

The meaning of sovereignty has not remained static since that time. More recent
political pronouncements and scholarly treatments of the subject of sovereignty have
rightly given greater emphasis to the duality of the concept of sovereignty and the idea
that it has both internal and external aspects.90 In 2000, the government of Canada
spearheaded the formation of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS), which concluded that: “[S]overeignty implies a dual responsibility:
externally – to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the
dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state.”91 This theme has been echoed
by United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan92 and the U.N. High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change. In its recent report, the U.N. High-Level Panel stated:
“In signing the Charter of the United Nations, States not only benefit from the privileges
of sovereignty but also accept its responsibilities. Whatever perceptions may have
prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of State sovereignty,
today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own
peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international community.”93 Thus,
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sovereignty has an external component which concerns relations with other states and an
internal component which concerns relations between the government and the governed.
a.

External Aspects of Sovereignty

The external component of sovereignty relates to the international law of
sovereignty, which defines the criteria for statehood and recognition as an equal member
of the international community and regulates how nations are to behave toward one
another.94 Emphasizing the international law aspects of sovereignty, the International
Court of Justice has defined sovereignty as: “The whole body of rights and attributes
which a state possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other states, and also in its
relations with other states.”95 Thus, under international law, the concept of sovereignty
bestows an equality of states and independence of action.96 It is reflected in international
law in a variety of ways, such as in the United Nations Charter.97 Thus, the concept of
sovereignty derives from and is part of international law and sovereign states must take
international law into account when exercising their sovereign powers.
These external or international aspects of sovereignty were crucial to the
formation of the new United States of America.98 They guaranteed her independence
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and equality among the community of states.99 They ensured her ability to enter into
contracts, i.e., treaties and other international agreements, with other states and to enforce
those contractual obligations.100
While international law is still concerned with the protection of these aspects of
sovereignty, it now recognizes that sovereignty ultimately rests in the people. It is the
object of modern international law to protect those people, not the authority wielding
power.101 As a result, under international law today, sovereignty can be violated by an
outside force or by an internal force that acts contrary to the wishes of the people.102
Thus, the concept of sovereignty today places more emphasis on its internal aspects.
b.

Internal Aspects of Sovereignty

This internal component of sovereignty requires that the sovereign state abide by
its social contract with the people. In the United States, this social contract is embodied
by the U.S. Constitution. Pursuant to this social contract, the people gave up certain
freedoms and submitted themselves to the authority of the federal government, in
exchange for certain protections from the government. Since pre-revolutionary times, it
has been accepted that the primary purpose of the government is the good of the

of a fledgling nation crucially depended upon the compatibility of its domestic law with the rules of the
international system within which it sought acceptance.”).
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people.103 Thus, the government has the right to make and enforce certain laws for the
public welfare, but also has the duty to protect the people within its territory.
3.

Influence of sovereignty theory on the United States

The founders of the United States clearly believed in both the external and
internal components of sovereignty theory and their natural law underpinnings. The
Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress provided:
That the inhabitants of the English Colonies in North
America, by the immutable laws of nature, the principles of
the English constitution, and the several charters or
compacts, have the following Rights:
Resolved, N.C.D.
1.
That they are entitled to life, liberty, and
property, & they have never ceded to any
sovereign power whatever, a right to dispose of
either without their consent.
2.
That our ancestors, who first settled these
colonies were at the time of their emigration
from the mother country, entitled to all the
rights, liberties and immunities of free and
natural-born subjects within the realm of
England.104
This theme of consent to be governed by way of a social contract based on natural
law principles was carried forward in the Declaration of Independence:
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary
for one people to dissolve the political bonds which have
connected them with another, and to assume among the
powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which
the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a
decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they
should declare the causes which impel the separation.
103
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We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed. 105
Finally, the preamble to the U.S. Constitution itself makes it clear that the
“People” are coming together to form a compact for the purpose of creating a better life
for themselves:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.106
Thus, the constitutional government of the United States is founded upon natural
law theories of equality of persons and states, social contract theory, and the idea that the
primary purpose of the government is the protection and betterment of the people, all of
which are part of the modern concept of sovereignty.
In recognition of this history, sovereignty has been used by the Supreme Court as
a source of federal power, rights and duties. For example, in the Chinese Exclusion Case,
the Supreme Court found that sovereignty implied an authority to deal with matters
relating to immigration, even though the power to regulate immigration was not expressly
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given to the federal government in the Constitution.107 Likewise, there is no express
constitutional grant of legislative power to Congress to make laws with respect to
maritime matters, yet the federal courts have implied such a grant in part by virtue of the
“ancient jurisdiction” inherent in admiralty of sovereign states108 and the grant of judicial
power in Article III § 2 to federal courts to hear cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction.109 There also is no general foreign affairs power in the Constitution, but in
Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland stated that the foreign affairs power of the federal
government came not from the states when they signed and ratified the U.S. Constitution,
but from international law concepts of sovereignty.110 Thus, the Supreme Court has
ascribed to these sovereignty theories and used them to justify action by the federal
government. In so doing, the Court must also accept the duties that come with being a
sovereign state –the primary duty of which is to conduct the government for the benefit
of the people.
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C.

Individual Rights in the US

Natural law theories exercised a heavy influence on the founding fathers not only
with respect to ideas of sovereignty and social compacts, but also with respect to ideas of
individual rights.111
1. Natural law underpinnings of individual rights in the U.S.
Constitution
Most scholars agree that the framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights were
committed to the idea of natural rights in the context of social contract political theory.112
In particular, the reasoning of John Locke and the example of the English Bill of Rights
had a great influence on the U.S. Bill of Rights.113 Several of the founding fathers were
ardent adherents to natural rights theory, including James Wilson, James Madison,114 and
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John Adams.115 Likewise, Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson believed that there were
natural rights which could not be restrained or repealed by human laws.116
In pre-revolutionary America, religious and political leaders (who were often one
and the same) affirmed that positive laws must be in accord with divine law and natural
law.117 For example, in 1717, John Wise, a distinguished Massachusetts clergyman,
preached that it is because “God does not permit it, that rulers cannot invade the rights
and liberties of the people.”118 In 1744, Reverend Elisha Williams observed that arbitrary
governments are not really governments, but tyrants, and are absolutely against the laws
of God and nature.119 Richard Bland, a cousin of Thomas Jefferson from Virginia, wrote
in 1766 that government is only lawful as long as “it will conduce to [men’s] happiness,
which they have a natural right to promote.”120 According to all these men, when
government violates higher law, the government may be disrespected.121 Governments
were obliged to obey God’s law and to serve God’s people.122
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As quoted above, the 1774 Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental
Congress included natural law concepts regarding entitlement to life, liberty and
property.123 This was followed by the 1776 Virginia Bill of Rights, which foreshadowed
the Declaration of Independence, and asserted several natural rights, including the right
of equality, the right to enjoy life and liberty with the means of acquiring and possessing
property, the right to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, the right to alter or abolish a
government that does not act for the public good, the right to suffrage, the right of due
process, the right not to be punished in any cruel or unusual manner, the right to freedom
of the press, and the right of freedom of religion.124 Other states’ bills of rights also
contained similar natural rights guarantees.
The Declaration of Independence followed shortly thereafter and was heavily
influenced by Locke’s natural law theories as well.125 It suggests a right of selfdetermination based on natural law126 and then lists several inalienable rights, including
equality of man, and the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.127
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In proposing the Bill of Rights to the Constitution, James Madison suggested
certain amendments that he believed should properly be recommended by the Congress to
the States, including the following:
First. That there be prefixed to the Constitution a
declaration, that all power is originally vested in, and
consequently derived from, the people.
That Government is instituted and ought to be exercised for
the benefit of the people; which consists in the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using
property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety.
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and
indefeasible right to reform or change their government,
whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes
of the institution.128
In addition to these expressly enumerated rights, Madison’s proposed amendments also
included references to unenumerated rights retained by the people:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made
in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to
diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the
people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the
Constitution; but either as actual limitations of such
powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.129
This language came to be the present-day Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
The first government of United States also demonstrated its commitment to
natural rights in connection with an incident that occurred during the French war with
Great Britain in 1793. Three months after the declaration of war by France in February

128

James, Madison, Speech Introducing Proposed Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789), reprinted in
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: PRIMARY SOURCES at 338.

129

Id. at 339 (emphasis added).

34

1793, President George Washington issued a proclamation of neutrality on the part of the
United States. Several difficult questions arose as to the United States’ rights and duties
as a neutral country. Accordingly, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, at President
George Washington’s request, wrote to the U.S. Supreme Court to solicit the justices’
advice regarding the international law of neutrality. In this letter, Jefferson asks the
Supreme Court’s opinion as to both international law and the law of nature:
The war which has taken place among the powers of
Europe produces frequent transactions within our ports and
limits, on which questions arise of considerable difficulty,
and of greater importance to the peace of the United States.
These questions depend for their solution on the
construction of our treaties, on the laws of nature and
nations, and on the law of the land, and are often presented
under circumstances which do not give a cognizance of
them to the tribunals of the country.130
The Supreme Court declined to provide the requested guidance for jurisprudential
reasons. However, the correspondence is relevant in demonstrating the importance of
natural law and international law to the early republic. As at least one scholar has
suggested, “the modern debate is not over whether it was a central end of the Constitution
to secure natural rights, but the relationship of such natural rights to the law of the
Constitution.”131 This relationship is the subject of some of the following sections of this
article.
This section has established that the drafting of the U.S. Constitution was strongly
influenced by concepts of both divine law and natural law.132 The Constitution is the
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supreme positive law that protects individual rights.133 It was drafted to carry out the
promises and aspirations set forth in the Declaration of Independence, which, as
demonstrated above, relied heavily on natural law theories of a social compact between
the people and the government and the idea of inherent individual rights.134
The problem with natural law was and is, of course, that it is so hard to ascertain
exactly what the “rules” of natural law are. As Professor Ely points out, natural law has
historically been invoked to “support all manner of causes in this country – some worthy,
others nefarious.”135 Thus, while natural law may inform our constitutional
understandings, it has fallen out of favor as a method of creating rules for decision. As
discussed below, I suggest here that international human rights principles are the
successor to natural law theory and provide more concrete rules of decision that can
better inform our constitutional jurisprudence.
2.

Unenumerated Rights under the U.S. Constitution

Although the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled over the years to locate the
source and define the scope of rights not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, it has
frequently declared that such rights exist and has taken on the role of guarantor of such
rights. In finding and defining the existence and scope of such rights, some justices have
relied on natural law concepts, others on the Ninth Amendment and others on the due
process clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendment, or some combination thereof.

133

HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note __ , at 84.

134

Id. at 84-85.

135

ELY, The Ninth Amendment, supra note ___ , 50.

36

a.

The influence of natural law theories on the U.S.
Supreme Court as the basis of unenumerated rights

While not overwhelming in number, there have been several justices in the history
of the U.S. Supreme Court who have demonstrated their awareness of the role of natural
law in the framing of the Constitution and the corresponding appropriateness of using
such theories in constitutional interpretation. What follows is a brief survey of some of
the more important opinions in this regard.
James Wilson, an early justice of the Supreme Court, believed strongly in the
existence of natural law.136 “[I]n his view human law was grounded on the consent of
those whose obedience the law required. He thus linked the doctrine of natural law with
the theory of popular sovereignty.”137 Like Locke, Wilson believed that the state was
founded on the compact of its members, who united together for the common benefit.
According to Wilson, each man had a natural right to his property, his character, his
liberty and his safety.138 At least one scholar has described James Wilson’s philosophy
as “the most consistent expression of classical American philosophy of law and
government” and has stated that it was shared by most of the fathers of the
Constitution.139
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story also was a firm believer in the existence of
natural law.140 In deciding The Schooner La Jeune Eugenie, Justice Story took the
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position that a strong international trend against the slave trade, evidenced by numerous
international declarations as well as by some municipal statutes directed against its
legality, might justify judicial recognition of a rule of international law condemning such
trade even though the institution of slavery had not been outlawed as unjust by some of
the leading nations of the world.141
In Chisholm v. Georgia,142 a case involving the question of whether an action in
assumpsit may lie against a state, several of the justices referred to natural law principles
in their respective opinions. Similarly, in Calder v. Bull,143 a case involving the probate
of a will, Justice Chase based his opinion on social compact theory and argued that any
act of a legislature that is contrary to the principles of the social compact cannot be
considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.144
b.

The Role of the Ninth Amendment

The influence of the idea of natural rights on the U.S. Constitution is particularly
evident in the language of the Ninth Amendment which states: “The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people.”145 This language recognizes that the people possessed rights that existed

141

United States v. The Schooner La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No.
15,511).

142

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (2 Dall. 419) (1793).

143

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).

144

Justice Iredell disputed this idea, arguing that the courts do not have the power to declare a law void as
violative of natural justice. Id. at __. For further discussion of the Supreme Court’s use of natural law
theory, see Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, supra note ___ , at 659-68.
145

U.S. CONST., amend. IX.

38

prior to the U.S. Constitution; they were not created by the Constitution. 146 The partial
listing in the Constitution of some of those antecedent rights should not be read in such a
way as to undermine the existence or scope of any other non-enumerated rights that were
“retained by the people.”147
In the contraceptive case of Griswold v. Connecticut,148 for example, Justice
Douglas cited the Ninth Amendment in support of his opinion and stated that the court
was “deal[ing] with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights,”149 leaving no doubt
as to his belief in preexisting unenumerated constitutional rights (although he attempted
to tie those unenumerated rights to enumerated rights through “penumbras” and
“emanations”). Likewise, in his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg stated his view
that, “the language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers of the
Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected from
governmental infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically
mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments.”150
Some scholars have disputed the idea that U.S. citizens have any rights that may
be protected by the government apart from those expressly enumerated in the
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Constitution.151 The fear seems to be that once we admit that unenumerated rights exist,
judges will be free to exercise unlimited discretion in identifying and enforcing such
rights.152 To address this concern, it is argued that only the democratically elected and
more politically accountable Congress should be the arbiter of such rights. If Congress
has not recognized the right, it does not exist as an enforceable right.153
But denying the existence and protection of preexisting unenumerated rights is
contrary to the language of the documents on which this country was founded. For
example, the Declaration of Independence refers to “inalienable rights,” which means
that these rights are “incapable of being alienated, surrendered or transferred.”154 Thus, it
is not possible for the people to give any of their inalienable rights to the government.
The Ninth Amendment assumes the existence of certain unnamed rights. If Congress has
to enumerate the right before it may be protected by any branch of government, these
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words have no meaning.155 And if the judiciary, as a part of the government, cannot
protect those unenumerated rights, then those rights either have little, if any, substance, or
essentially have been alienated contrary to the intention of the framers.156
International human rights law can help to address the concerns of some scholars
that allowing the recognition and protection of unenumerated rights opens a Pandora’s
Box of limitless judicial discretion. If judges take into consideration the existence and
scope of a right under international human rights law in the context of deciding whether
such a right exists in our own constitutional jurisprudence, such reference can help to
shape and limit judges’ abilities to create new rights or expand existing rights. If no such
right is expressly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, and no such right can be found in
international human rights law, a federal judge would be hard-pressed to justify the
recognition of such a right.
But even assuming, arguendo, that the only rights that are part of the Constitution
and that may be protected by the government are the ones expressly mentioned in the
Constitution, international law could and should be used to help define the contours of
those rights that are expressly mentioned. In this way, international law would still have
a role in constitutional interpretation as to the meaning of ambiguous terms such as due
process, cruel and unusual punishment, and habeas corpus.
155
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c.

Substantive Due Process

Perhaps because of this debate regarding the appropriate role and meaning of the
Ninth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has more recently grounded unenumerated
“fundamental rights” in the concept of substantive due process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.157
Some scholars have demonstrated that natural law philosophy heavily influenced
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Bill of Rights, and especially the due process
clause, during the Court’s early history.158 For example, in Savings and Loan Assoc. v.
Topeka,159 the Supreme Court stated:
There are . . . rights in every free government beyond the
control of the state. A government which recognized no
such rights, which held the lives, the liberty, the property of
its citizens subject at all times to the absolute power, is
after all but a despotism . . . There are limitations on such
power which grow out of the essential nature of all free
governments, implied reservations of individual rights,
without which the social compact could not exist, and
which are respected by all governments entitled to the
name.160
Similarly, the Court has repeatedly held that while “[t]he Constitution does not
explicitly mention any right of privacy . . . one aspect of the ‘liberty’ protected by the
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is ‘a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy.’”161 And while the Court has never
defined the outer limits of the right of privacy, its decisions have extended that right to
include a variety of personal decisions a person may make without unjustified
governmental interference, such as the right of parents to make decisions about childrearing and education,162 the right of couples to make decisions about procreation,163
contraception,164 abortion,165 and marriage.166 In Meyer, the Court defined liberty
broadly to “denote[] not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of an
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.”167
Accordingly, on numerous occasions, the Court has been willing to find rights to
be protected by the Constitution that are not expressly mentioned therein. One reason the
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Court may have been willing to do so is the influence of the growing body of
international human rights law that recognizes certain universal, fundamental rights that
belong to all persons, regardless of their specific expression in the positive domestic law
of a state.
The Supreme Court has thus assumed the role of guarantor of natural or
unenumerated rights by way of its power to review the acts of the other branches of
government and determine whether those acts are consistent with higher law principles,
whether those rights are grounded in natural law, the Ninth Amendment or the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.168
D.

The Emergence of International Human Rights Law

American notions of individual rights both contributed to the development of
international human rights law and, more recently, have been influenced by that growing
body of international law in turn. Accordingly, this next section briefly traces the
development of international human rights law and its influence on U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence of individual rights.
1.

Evolution from natural law to international human rights law

Like the international law of sovereignty, the international human rights law is
founded on natural law. However, exactly the opposite of early sovereignty theories,
early theories of divine and natural law focused on universal responsibilities of man
rather than rights.169 Several historical events, including the decline of feudalism, the
168
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expansion of commerce, and an emerging middle class, contributed to a growing interest
in the concept of rights.170 In 1761, Thomas Paine produced THE RIGHTS OF MAN which
introduced the specific expression “human rights.” 171
Both religious beliefs and moral and political philosophy contributed to the
development of international human rights.172 One author states it thus: “Human rights is
a twentieth-century name for what has been traditionally known as natural rights or, in a
more exhilarating phrase, the rights of man.”173 Human rights law is rooted in natural
law.174 Some scholars have suggested that the very idea of human rights is “ineliminably
religious.”175 Other scholars have suggested that it is just this connection to “higher law”
or natural law that has caused some scholars and judges to be apprehensive when
approaching human rights claims.176
2.

U.S. participation in the development of international human rights

While the idea of human rights has been around for several centuries, modern
international human rights law only really developed in a concrete form following World
War II.177 It found expression in the United Nations Charter,178 the 1948 Universal
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Declaration of Human Rights,179 and subsequent treaties. The U.N. Charter and the
Universal Declaration gave voice to many of the rights contained in the U.S. Bill of
Rights on an international level.180
The United States was a leader in the development of international human rights.
It hosted the conference at which the United Nations Charter was drafted. It was one of
the five victor countries that conducted the Nuremburg trials - the first time individuals
were held accountable for war crimes before an international criminal tribunal. The
United States participated in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well
as the more detailed International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. While the United
States has sometimes been reluctant to ratify certain international human rights treaties,
such as the recent Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC), it has remained
deeply involved in the development of international human rights norms, including the
drafting of the ICC Charter.
3.

The U.S. Supreme Court Has Consistently Used Foreign and
International Law throughout Its History

While it is clear that the United States government has been an active participant
in developing the rules of international human rights law, the question remains: what
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impact has that international activity had on courts and the development of the law in the
United States? As American University Dean Claudio Grossman stated in his opening
remarks in the recent Scalia-Beyer Discussion regarding the Supreme Court’s use of
international and foreign law: “It is important to recognize that since the early 19th
century, Supreme Court cases have relied, without much fuss or fanfare, on certain
foreign materials.”181 Several scholars have documented the Supreme Court’s use of
foreign and international legal materials throughout its history.182 Accordingly, I do not
propose to review that entire history here. However, one particularly interesting recent
study demonstrated that 25% of the early Supreme Court’s docket consisted of cases
involving foreign and international issues and concluded that the early Supreme Court
was in the day-to-day business of foreign affairs.183
Dean of Yale Law School, Harold Hongju Koh, suggests that, historically, the
Supreme Court “has regularly looked to foreign and international precedents as an aid to
constitutional interpretation in at least three situations,” which he calls, “parallel rules,”
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“empirical light,” and “community standard.”184 First, the Court has noted when legal
rules in the United States “parallel those of other nations, particularly those with similar
legal and social traditions.”185 Second, “empirical light” refers to the fact that the Court
“has long considered as relevant and informative the way in which foreign courts have
applied standards roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly
comparable circumstances.”186 Third, the Court has considered international and foreign
legal sources when a U.S constitutional concept such as “cruel and unusual” or “due
process” by its own terms implicitly refers to a community standard.187 Thus, there is
ample evidence that the Supreme Court has frequently referred to foreign and
international sources throughout its history and has used these sources to assist in
interpreting federal statutes, treaties, and the U.S. Constitution.
4.

Implications for the Future

The changes in the understanding of the meaning of sovereignty and the
development of international human rights law described above have far-reaching
implications for nation-states such as the United States. As Professor Reisman has stated:
“By shifting the fulcrum of the system from the protection of sovereigns to the protection
of the people, [international human rights law] works qualitative changes in virtually
every component.”188 This new concept of sovereignty even affects the relationship
between national and international law. Because international law acts to create and
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define a sovereign state and its duty to protect its people, the actions of any particular
state carried out in fulfillment of that duty must be measured by both international and
national law standards. It has long been established that national law may not be
invoked to justify violations of international law.189 If the international law concept of
sovereignty is used to assert federal power, as has been done by the Supreme Court in the
cases cited above, then it also should be used to inform the meaning of limits on
sovereignty suggested by international human rights norms.190 As Professor Ronald
Brand has stated: “If the role of the sovereign is to provide security, and strengthening the
international rule of law results in increased security, then the role of the sovereign must
be to strengthen the international rule of law.”191 This mandate applies to all branches of
government – the legislative, executive, and judiciary. Thus, U.S. courts, as one branch
of the federal government, share in the sovereign duty to protect and are therefore derelict
in their duties if they do not judge the lawfulness of government action by both national
and international law standards, including international human rights law.
V.

Objections to the Use of Foreign and International Law

Despite this frequent use of foreign and international law by the Supreme Court,
Justice Scalia remains unconvinced of the merits of looking to foreign law in particular.
He has two responses to the argument that the Framers of the U.S. Constitution were
influenced by foreign law. First, he argues that the Framers “didn’t have a lot of respect
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for many of the rules in European countries.”192 However, he does admit thatthe framers
“used a lot of foreign law,” which is evidenced by discussions of the Swiss and German
systems in the Federalist Papers.193 He further states that while foreign law may be
useful in devising a constitution, it is not useful in interpreting one.194 Justice Scalia
argues that when interpreting the U.S. Constitution, the appropriate judicial task is to
understand what it meant when it was adopted and that the meaning of the Constitution
does not change over time.195
To perform the task of determining the Constitution’s original meaning, Justice
Scalia admits that one must look to foreign sources to determine what the constitution
meant when it was drafted; however, he would limit that inquiry to “Old English law.”196
Although the Federalist Papers are full of references to foreign law and the law of
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nations,197 Justice Scalia only allows for reliance on “Old English law” because many
constitutional phrases, such as due process, are taken from “Old English law.” 198
However, English law was not formed in isolation any more than American law has been.
It was influenced by Roman law, other European law and the law of nations.199
Moreover, many of the Framers were aware of and influenced by the French Revolution
and the Declaration of the Rights of Man.200 Thus, even under an originalist theory of
interpretation, in order to fully understand what the Framers had in mind, it is likely that
we need to look beyond just “Old English law” to other foreign systems to understand
what these words meant when the Constitution was drafted.201
Justice Scalia ascribes to a textualist theory of interpretation, which he has
described as follows: “A text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be
construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all this fairly means.”202
In order to determine what constitutes a “reasonable” interpretation, it is likely that an
interpreter will consider common methods of interpretation such as considering the
ordinary meaning of a word, the intent of the framers, and the context in which the words
are used, among other possible sources of information. Because the framers of the
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Constitution were influenced by natural law and the law of nations, using this method of
interpretation opens the door to consider such sources in determining what interpretation
is reasonable.
In any event, a static originalist theory of the Constitution is a bankrupt method of
interpretation for those who were not included in the early Constitutional experiment. As
Professor Louis Henkin rightly points out, the social compact made at the time of the
founding of our nation was made by only a small portion of the inhabitants of the United
States.203 Only property owners were allowed to vote. Poor men, slaves, and women
were excluded. Therefore, the original social compact lacks a certain amount of
legitimacy for these groups. While the framers of the Constitution laid a very worthwhile
foundation, why should today’s citizens be bound by the values of a minority group that
lived over 200 years ago? As Henkin has argued: “The Constitution as social compact
requires a contemporary compact by the people today.”204 The continuing legitimacy of
the Constitution may depend on whether it accurately expresses the will and values of the
people today.
Using international human rights law to inform the meaning of the Constitution
today may actually increase that constitutional legitimacy because the United States has
been a leader in helping to create that law and thus it reflects our more contemporary
values. International human rights law is inclusive of all the groups mentioned above
who were excluded from the original social compact. Today, there are numerous
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international treaties specifically designed to guard against racial discrimination205 and to
protect the rights of women.206
Justice Scalia also is concerned that using foreign law is dangerous because U.S.
judges will not be familiar with the surrounding jurisprudence such that they are likely to
misunderstand the foreign rules.207 While this might be a danger, it would seem that the
answer is not to discard the use of foreign law, but to be better educated about it. It is
really the job of the attorneys in any given case to educate the court about any applicable
law and that includes foreign and international law.208
Furthermore, Justice Scalia’s objection to references to international law in recent
cases such as Atkinsand Lawrence is inconsistent with his acceptance of the supremacy
of U.S. treaty law. The United States is a party to the ICCPR, which makes it part of the
supreme law of the land.209 In joining the ICCPR, the United States undertook an
obligation to take any steps necessary to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights set forth in the ICCPR.210 Article 7 of the ICCPR
states that “No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
205
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or punishment.”211 Prior to the Atkins decision, the Human Rights Committee, a body
created by the ICCPR to monitor compliance with the Convention,212 expressed regret
that the United States did not protect mentally retarded persons from the death penalty.213
While the United States has made a reservation to the ICCPR with respect to the
imposition of the death penalty, there is some doubt regarding whether its reservation is
valid as a matter of treaty law.214 But even if the reservation is valid as a legal matter, the
widespread acceptance among the nations of the world of the treaty’s ban on the death
penalty is certainly evidence of evolving standards of decency and should inform our
view of acceptable treatment of mentally retarded persons.
In addition, the European Union’s amicus brief establishing overwhelming
disapproval for the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally
retarded offenders provides evidence of custom and general principles of law in this area.
Because international law is part of our law, the Supreme Court had a duty to examine
the practices of the world community to determine whether those practices may establish
an international rule that is binding on the United States. 215
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In his recent confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts expressed concern
about the use of foreign law, suggesting that it does not limit judicial discretion because
“you can find anything you want . . . As somebody said in a different context, looking at
foreign law for support is like looking out over a crowd and picking out you’re your
friends.”216 While Justice Roberts has expressed a valid concern about the use of foreign
law generally, where there is virtually unanimous consensus among the rest of the world
condemning an action like the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles or the
mentally retarded, his point is not as well taken.
As in Atkins, the majority’s reference to international law in Lawrence was
entirely appropriate. First, references in Lawrence to non-U.S. sources were made to
rebut claims made by other justices in similar cases in order to establish equal treatment
of the issue. The majority in Lawrence used foreign and international law to rebut Chief
Justice Burger’s claims regarding the historical condemnation of homosexual practices in
Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards in Bowers v. Hardwick. 217 Thus, the
majority was not doing anything that had not been done before.
Second, such references were appropriate because the United States is bound by
international treaty obligations to respect the right of privacy in one’s home and to
provide for equal protection of the law. In these regards, Article 17 of the ICCPR
provides that: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or
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reputation,” and that: “Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.”218 Article 26 of the ICCPR further provides: “All persons are
equal before the law and are entitled without discrimination to the equal protection of the
law.”219 Even Justice Scalia should be willing to admit that ratified treaty obligations
ought to inform our understanding of these rights.
A misperception may exist that because the U.S. Senate declared articles 1-27 of
the ICCPR to be non-self-executing, the entire treaty is not enforceable by U.S. courts
and therefore should not be used by U.S. courts in their decision-making. While the selfexecuting treaty doctrine does prevent litigants from bringing a claim based on the nonself-executing portions of a treaty, the self-executing treaty doctrine does not bar courts
from taking into account the United States’ treaty obligations altogether.220 When the
President of the United States signs a treaty and two-thirds of the Senators give their
consent to that treaty, the United States has expressed its political will that the United
States is in agreement with the treaty’s statements regarding international rights and
duties. A ratified treaty creates binding international legal obligations for the United
States even if it is not directly enforceable in U.S. courts. The treaty becomes part of the
Supreme Law of the Land under the Supremacy Clause and will trump inconsistent state
laws. U.S. courts have recognized that even when a treaty contemplates further action by
the other branches of government, “the judicial branch should certainly attempt to reflect
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in its decisionmaking the spirit as well as the letter of an international agreement to which
the United States is a party.”221
The federal courts have long stated that they will not assume that Congress
intends to violate the United States’ international obligations.222 Accordingly, where
there are competing interpretations of a federal statute and a treaty to which the U.S. is a
party, the courts will adopt the interpretation that attempts to reconcile the two.223 U.S.
courts likewise should use the language of a treaty to which the United States is a party to
inform the understanding of individual rights under the Constitution and choose an
interpretation that reconciles the two whenever possible.

Doing so will assist the United

States in avoiding violations of its international obligations. It is also consistent with the
democratic will as expressed by the legislative and executive branches when they ratified
the treaty.
The United States also is bound by any relevant customary international law
separate and apart from its treaty obligations.224 Despite this long-established principle,
some scholars and judges are uncomfortable with the application of customary
international law, perhaps because customary international rules are not written
“positive” laws, or because they can be vague and rest on diffuse sources that are hard to
find. 225 Treaties often contain very vague and broadly worded obligations as well, yet
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they are still considering binding “law.” Furthermore, while it is laudable that the law be
known and available to any interested person, difficulty in finding the law cannot be
determinative of its character as law. And while it is true that customary international
law often cannot be found in one place like a treaty, the rules of customary international
law are often written down in diplomatic correspondence, executive orders, and similar
documents. In fact, the U.S. government has often made public statements officially
accepting the binding nature of certain rules of customary international law that have
been codified in treaties which the United States has not ratified, such as the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties226 and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.227
Some judges and scholars also have expressed concerns about the political
foundations of customary international law believing that is not well grounded because it
is not expressly made the law of the land in the Constitution and is not approved by the
Senate or Congress.228 While it is true that the supremacy clause of the Constitution only
mentions treaties and not customary international law, the Constitution does take into
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account customary international law in at least one other place, i.e., its reference to
offenses against the laws of nations in Article I.229 Furthermore, the Executive Branch,
which is charged with taking a primary role in foreign affairs, is daily involved in the
creation of the rules of customary international law through its practices and
pronouncements. Thus, it is perfectly appropriate for U.S. courts to continue to ascertain
and apply customary international law just as they have done for more than two centuries.
A similar objection that has been raised with respect to the use of foreign legal
materials is that foreign legal materials have no democratic provenance or connection to
the U.S. legal system and thus lack democratic accountability.230 Justice Breyer responds
to this concern by stating that the court relies on many extrinsic sources in constitutional
interpretation which lack a democratic base, including the work of legal scholars.231
Thus, using foreign or international materials is no worse. More importantly, however,
he points out that transnational law is created by the interaction of many constituencies,
such as the interested public, affected groups, specialists, legislatures, and others.232
“That is the democratic process in action.”233 Persons and groups in the United States
participate in this process.234 The United States, as the most powerful state in the
international system, has a predominant role in creating the rules of international law,
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whether by negotiating and drafting treaties or by its conduct leading to the creation of
customary international law. Thus, with respect to international law, the United States’
legislative and executive branches both have a role in creating the rules and can be held
accountable for their actions in this regard.
Thus, concerns that anti-democratic processes may influence U.S. judges rings
much truer with respect to foreign legal materials than with respect to international
materials, because the democratically elected bodies and other groups in the United
States participate in the formation of international legal rules. Furthermore, the United
States can further alleviate any anti-democratic concerns by being a full and vigorous
participant in developing transnational law in the future.235
The United States may even influence foreign legal materials to the extent that
foreign legislatures and judges take into account what other countries are doing when
fashioning their own rules. Because the United States is the most powerful country in the
world in the present time and because historically, it has a long history of democratic
governance and protection of individual rights, it is likely that the United States is one of
the countries whose practices will be considered.236
As a general proposition, however, international law does have more legitimacy
in the U.S. legal system than foreign law because the U.S. has a greater role in shaping
international law than foreign law.237 As a result, there are different considerations at
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work with respect to the use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation. In the Knight
v. Florida death penalty case, Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which he
suggested some standards for the use of foreign law. 238 He suggests the use of foreign
law is appropriate in two situations. First, it is appropriate when there exists a roughly
comparable question and there is a transnational or global aspect to the case, there are
shared standards, or world opinion is implicated. Second, the use of foreign law is
appropriate when roughly comparable legal standards exist, i.e., when the external or
foreign norms resonate internally. Justice Breyer suggests that this last situation is most
likely to occur with respect to Europe and its former colonies because of our shared
human rights heritage.239
These suggestions are worthy of consideration. However, use of foreign law
should be approached with particular caution. A specific nation’s laws reflect that
nation’s history, culture, and legal system. Thus, any one nation’s legal rules are likely to
be of limited value to another nation with a different history, culture and legal system.
However, if a worldwide survey is conducted and many or most nations of the world
have adopted a particular legal rule, that rule will reflect a consensus derived from many
different cultures and legal system and will likely be more useful and persuasive.
Finally, persons on both sides of the debate agree that part of what is driving this
debate regarding the use of international and foreign law is a concern that such law will
be used by judges in an unprincipled manner to support the judges’ personal
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viewpoints.240 Justice Breyer responds to this concern by arguing that a good way to
counter the possibility of judges imposing their own moral values is for judges to look
outside themselves and see how society is dealing with the issue – including looking to
foreign societies and international law.241 Moreover, it may be argued that international
law is a more effective interpretive tool than many other external sources a judge may use
because rules of international law are “a product of years of distillation of principles
formed through international consensus,” that are evidenced by state practice and
agreements that articulate the relevant principles.242 As a result, reliance on a rule of
international law may actually reduce an individual judge’s subjectivity when interpreting
constitutional provisions.243
For all these reasons, it is incorrect to suggest that references to international and
foreign law have no place in U.S. Constitutional interpretation.
VI.

Why should the Supreme Court continue to use international and foreign
law?
Thus far, this article has established the political and historical bases for the

incorporation of international law and to a lesser extent, foreign law, principles into U.S.
constitutional jurisprudence and has described both the historical and recent use of
international and foreign law by the U.S. Supreme Court. It also has responded to the
concerns of critics. This section provides some reasons why the Supreme Court should
continue to use international and foreign law in the future.
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The most important reason supporting the Supreme Court’s continued use of
international law is that the Constitution requires it. As noted above, the Constitution
makes treaties part of the supreme law of the land on par with federal statutes.244 When
the political branches have come together and agreed to sign and ratify a treaty, the
Supreme Court should give deference to the judgment of the other branches as to the
rules of international law expressed in that treaty and should assist the United States in
complying with its treaty obligations by adopting an interpretation that is consistent with
those treaty obligations whenever possible.245
Even when the Constitution does not expressly incorporate international law,
federal statutes may, such as in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act246 or the Alien
Tort Statute.247 It also seems fairly uncontroversial that when the U.S. Supreme Court is
interpreting a treaty, it should take into account the practice of states and prior judicial
decisions interpreting the same treaty made by courts of other parties to the treaty
because such evidence would be relevant and useful evidence of the meaning of the
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treaty.248 Thus, the Supreme Court should continue to use international and foreign legal
sources when it is required to do so by the Constitution or by statute.
Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court must continue to ascertain and apply
customary international law principles when called for by the Constitution or by federal
statute. For example, the Court may need to consider customary international law
pursuant to the Constitution’s grant of authority to Congress to define and punish
offenses against the law of nations,249 as it did in United States v. Smith.250
The recent case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain provides a timely example of a
statutory requirement to consider customary international law. In Sosa, the Supreme
Court was required by the Alien Tort Statute to determine whether particular conduct
constituted a tort under the law of nations.251 The Supreme Court affirmed that it was
required to ascertain and apply a modern-day understanding of international torts, at least
where the norm of international character is accepted by the civilized world and defined
with specificity.252
Use of international treaty law and the customary international law of human
rights to inform U.S. constitutional rights jurisprudence also can be justified under and
reconciled with many classic theories of constitutional interpretation.253 From an
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originalist perspective, such usage is appropriate because the founding fathers were
heavily influenced by foreign and international law and incorporated some of these
sources and ideas into the Constitution (although a “hard” originalist might only allow for
international law as it existed at the time of the writing of the Constitution).254 A natural
law proponent should be open to using international human rights law to inform U.S.
U.S. individual rights jurisprudence because of their shared natural law foundations and
their mutual influence on the development of the other. From a structural
majoritarianism perspective, it may be argued that appropriate use of foreign and
international law where it has been created and approved by the political branches of the
federal government demonstrates proper deference to those branches. On the other hand,
an interpretive majoritarianism view might use present-day concepts of sovereignty and
international human rights to facilitate our understanding of the meaning of a “living”
constitution that changes over time in response to societal changes. Finally, a pragmatic
approach might encourage examination of foreign legal experiences to better understand
the consequences of different legal solutions for common legal problems.255
Moreover, using international and foreign law will assist the U.S. government in
carrying out its duty to protect the people. Modern conceptions of sovereignty require
that the sovereign state take seriously its responsibility to protect its citizens. This
conception of sovereignty places a duty on states to ask if they are fulfilling this
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES §§ 1.101–1.104 (LexisNexis 2d ed. 2000)
(providing an historical overview of constitutional theories).
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obligation.256 Because human rights are rights, and not aspirations, the government has
an obligation to protect such rights.257 While many international human rights are said to
be universal and do not differ substantively in different national legal systems, they
depend on national governments for their protection.258 If the state is not providing a
level of protection for human rights that has been widely adopted elsewhere in the world,
perhaps it is time for the state to reexamine why this is the case. Such an examination
does not necessarily require a change in the law, as there may be important and justifiable
reasons that a state has chosen a particular legal rule, (such as competing human rights
values), but at least requiring that examination could force a state to confront its laws and
practices and have to justify them to its own polity and to the world.259
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court should take international human rights norms
into account because it is good foreign relations policy. Taking international human
rights norms into account serves foreign relations purposes by allowing the United States
to maintain a position of leadership in international affairs, earn a “good” reputation,
encourage good human rights practices in other countries, promote conditions conducive
to trade, and encourage peace and stability.260
In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court should continue to consider international and
foreign legal materials in its work because it is sometimes required to do so by the
256

As Thomas Jefferson stated, governments are instituted “to secure these rights.” HENKIN, THE AGE OF
supra note __, at 87.

RIGHTS,
257

HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note __, at 3.

258

Id. at 2, 17.

259

On the other hand, if there is little agreement in international law regarding the prevailing human rights
standards, international law would not be so helpful and U.S. justices would be freer to form their own
conclusions about the parameters of a particular right based solely on our own constitutional history.

260

See HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS at 152.

66

constitution or by federal statute, because it increases the legitimacy of the court’s
jurisprudence, and because it is good foreign relations policy.
VII.

How should international law by used by Supreme Court in the future?
At the outset of the article, I noted that one criticism of the Supreme Court’s use

of foreign and international law it that there is a lack of guidelines or standards as to
when use of such sources is appropriate. I believe this criticism is valid. While some
attempts have been made to offer such guidelines, they remain incomplete. Accordingly,
in this final section, I will offer some additional ideas for guidelines or standards that may
be useful in assessing the appropriateness of the use of foreign and international law
sources by the Supreme Court in the future.
Before embarking on that endeavor, however, I wish to offer one caveat. Inherent
in the U.S.’s tripartite system of government is a certain reliance on the wisdom and
integrity of the judges who sit on the federal bench. They are appointed for life in part
because we expect them to act as checks on the other branches of government without
fear of retaliation. On a daily basis, they are asked to interpret ambiguous laws, whether
they be domestic or international. This system allows the judges a certain level of
discretion when deciding cases, regardless of whether international or foreign law is used
by the judges is involved. Thus, no absolute or rigid guidelines for the use of
international or foreign law are possible or even desirable.
Justice Scalia has complained, however, that there is a lack of international
consensus on many legal rules and that the U.S. Supreme Court lack criteria to assist in
deciding when and which of these foreign rules to use. This criticism is a potentially
troubling, but no more so than Justice Scalia’s concerns with respect to the use of any
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external source in constitutional interpretation. As both Justices Scalia and Breyer point
out, using international or foreign law is similar to using any other external source, such
as legislative history, in interpreting a vague or ambiguous constitutional term or
phrase.261 The court has been able to successfully use legislative history when it has
found such history to be persuasive or useful. In this regard, Justice Breyer argues that
the Supreme Court cites many sources in its jurisprudence and that the main guideline for
using these external sources is their usefulness.262 Likewise, it does not seem like an
insurmountable hurdle for the justices to devise some loose guidelines for the use of
international and foreign law in their jurisprudence.263 Set forth below are a few
suggestions in this regard.
A.

International and Foreign Law as an Interpretive Aid

First, international and foreign law may be used as an interpretive aid when the
language of the Constitution standing alone does not answer a question. Where the text
of the Constitution is perfectly clear (e.g., the necessary age of 35 to become President of
the United States), there usually is no need to consider extrinsic sources. However, in
many cases already discussed herein, the text is not perfectly clear on its face. Phrases
like liberty, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment all invite interpretation and
explanation. In such cases, it has been common for the Supreme Court to look to external
261
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sources to aid in its interpretation of these vague or ambiguous phrases. International
law, particularly international human rights norms, may be treated as an external source
to be used in interpretation of vague or ambiguous terms.264 As demonstrated above, it is
particularly appropriate to turn to international human rights law as an interpretive tool
given the common historical and theoretical foundations of U.S. individual rights and
international human rights law.
Legal positivists might object to the use of international law in this way because
they would limit themselves to “formal sources of law, [e.g.,] those formalized precepts
and mandates which have been promulgated or issued by a legislature, a constitutional
convention, a court, or an administrative agency.”265 Although treaties may fit the
definition of positive law, many other sources of international law may not. The problem
with limiting legal decision-makers exclusively to such formal sources of law is that
those sources do not answer every question.266 Positive laws always contain ambiguities
and gaps. In such cases, what means are available to legal decision-makers to resolve
these questions? Legal positivists have struggled to answer this question.267 Using
international human rights law to inform U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence can help to
solve this dilemma.268
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This is not a new idea. The U.S. Supreme Court has sanctioned the notion that
judges may look beyond strictly positive sources of law in a number of cases.269 And as
Justice Cardozo pointed out many years ago, many gaps in U.S. common law have been
filled by borrowing from Roman law or other legal systems.270
B.

The United States Constitution as a Floor for Human Rights

Another possibility would be to treat the relationship between foreign and
international law similarly to the relationship between state constitutions and the federal
constitution. In the U.S. federalist system, the U.S.Constitution provides a floor for the
protection of individual rights below which states may not go. States may provide more
protection for individual rights pursuant to their own laws and constitutions, but not less.
Foreign and international law could be treated similarly in that the U.S. Supreme Court
could refer to foreign and international law standards when they provide a higher level of
protection than the U.S. Constitution, but would never be forced to adopt a foreign or
international law standard that is less protective than that of the Constitution. In this way,
the Supreme Court would be assisting the United States in fulfilling its sovereign duty to
protect.
This approach would satisfy the objection that application of foreign or
international law would lead to the adoption of practices of a country with a poor human
rights record. However, it still does not answer the more difficult questions involving
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competing human rights, such as those of a mother and an unborn child in abortion
jurisprudence.
Of course, it also is settled law that “treaties are subject to the constitutional
limitations that apply to all exercises of federal power, principally, the prohibitions of the
Bill of Rights.”271 The Treaty Power does not extend “so far as to authorize what the
Constitution forbids.”272 Taking this proposition together with the Ninth Amendment’s
admonishment that the people retain rights in addition to those enumerated in the
Constitution, we see that international law can add to the list of individual rights retained
by the people and can be used to interpret or give meaning to rights that are enumerated
in the Constitution, but cannot take away rights enumerated in the Constitution.
C.

International and Foreign Law as an Educational Tool

Several of the Supreme Court justices and scholars have pointed out ways in
which international and foreign law can be a useful educational tool. First, surveying
international and foreign legal sources can show developing trends in the law. Second, it
can suggest new ways of approaching common problems.273 Third, it can stimulate
thinking about different solutions. Fourth, a non-U.S. legal source may suggest a
persuasive line of logic. Thus, international and foreign legal sources can be of
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tremendous educational value, regardless of whether such sources are formally relied
upon or cited as any kind of authority for the court’s opinion.
VIII. Conclusion
Individual rights in the United States are interrelated with the developing system
of international human rights. Both share a common ancestry deriving from natural law
principles and political theories of sovereignty. Proper understandings of sovereignty
recognize that sovereign states have both powers and responsibilities and that the primary
responsibility of the government is the protection of the people who created that
government and endowed it with its sovereignty in the first place. Thus, governments,
including courts, have a duty to take international law, including international human
rights, into account when interpreting national constitutions intended for the protection of
the people.
The implications for the United States are that while international law does not
trump the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court should consider international law rules in
constitutional interpretation whenever the political branches of government have adopted
international agreements or participated in the creation of customary international law
rules that express the United States’ position on human rights. It also should use
international law as an interpretive tool to inform its understanding of vague or
ambiguous constitutional provisions. Under the dictates of sovereignty theory, the Court
would never be forced to adopt a foreign practice that is less protective of the people
because that would be contrary to the entire purpose for which the government was
created. Rather, the Supreme Court should continue to use foreign and international law
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to expand our conception of human rights consistently with the Constitution and should
use international law as an interpretive and educational tool in appropriate circumstances.
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